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ARGUMENT IN REPLY
The District Court Erred In Reversing the Magistrate Court's Order Denying
Thiel's Motion For Release From Jail

A.

Introduction
The district court erred when it reversed the magistrate court's order

denying Corey Thiel's motion for immediate release from custody. Specifically,
the district court erred by concluding that I.C. § 20-621 gives county sheriffs the
authority to direct magistrate courts to release inmates.
B.

Idaho Code § 20-621 Does Not Require A Magistrate Court To Grant A
County Sheriff's Inmate Release Request
Idaho Code§ 20-621 reads:
Every person serving a jail sentence in a county jail in the
state of Idaho who has a good record as a prisoner and who
performs the tasks assigned him in an orderly and peaceable
manner, shall upon the recommendation of the sheriff be allowed
five (5) days off of each and every month of his sentence, by the
magistrate judge.
As the state has previously argued, (Appellant's brief, pp.6-10), I.C. § 20-

621 is ambiguous because it does not describe the respective roles and duties of
the county sheriff and magistrate court in the good-time early inmate release
process.

However, application of the tools of statutory construction and a

consideration of public policy reveal that the statute permits a county sheriff to
recommend the release of jail inmates, and permits the magistrate court to
exercise its discretion to consider whether or not the statute's requirements have
been satisfied. The statute does not permit a county sheriff to direct magistrate
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courts to release inmates in the absence of judicial review and input and
argument from the state and from crime victims.
In response to the state's argument, Thiel relies heavily on the statute's
inclusion of the term "shall."

(Respondent's brief, pp.5-7.) Thiel asserts this

term precludes any judicial review or use of discretion in the good-time early
inmate release process. (Id.)

However, in I.C. § 20-621, the term "shall" does

not so clearly limit the court's authority.

Rather than expressly and

unambiguously directing a magistrate court to release inmates in any particular
circumstance, the statute only indicates that an inmate "shall. .. be allowed"
release, if the requirements of the statute are met.

Rather than impose any

mandatory duty on the magistrate court, the statute merely defines the
parameters of when an inmate is eligible for (i.e., "allowed") early release, and
provides the county sheriff the authority to "recommend" release in these
circumstances. 1

See,~ City of Wheat Ridge v. Cerveny, 913 P.2d 1110,

1113-1115 (Colo. 1996) (interpreting a state constitutional provision that
"successful plaintiffs are allowed costs and reasonable attorney fees," as merely
permitting, rather than mandating, a court's issuing of costs and reasonable
attorney fees to a successful plaintiff).

1

Additionally, as discussed below, if the term "shall" in I.C. § 20-621 precludes
judicial review of a county sheriff's inmate release "recommendation," then this
portion of the statute is unconstitutional.
This Court may strike this portion of
I.C. § 20-621 without striking the entire statute. State v. Nielsen, 131 Idaho 494,
497, 960 P.2d 177, 180 (1998) ("When part of a statute or ordinance is
unconstitutional and yet is not an integral or indispensable part of the measure,
the invalid portion may be stricken without affecting the remainder of the statute
or ordinance.").
2

Further, the very fact that the "magistrate judge" is referenced in I.C. § 20621 indicates that the magistrate court has some non-ministerial role in the I.C. §
20-621 good-time early inmate release process.

If the legislature intended to

grant county sheriffs the unreviewable authority to release inmates, it would have
omitted the magistrate judge from the statute altogether and expressly permitted
county sheriffs to release qualifying inmates themselves; or, at least, it would
have expressly limited the magistrate court's role in the process as one entirely
subject to the direction of the county sheriff.
Application of the tools of statutory construction, and a consideration of
the relevant public policy considerations, reveals that the legislature did not
intend to provide county sheriffs unbridled authority to direct magistrate courts to
release inmates. Therefore, the district court erred in reversing the magistrate
court's order denying Thiel's motion for release from custody.

C.

In The Alternative, To The Extent I.C. § 20-621 Provides County Sheriffs
The Authority To Direct Magistrate Courts To Release Inmates, The
Statute Violates The Idaho Constitution
The Idaho Constitution prohibits the legislature from "depriv[ing] the

judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it as a
coordinate department of the government." Idaho Const. Art. V, § 13; see also
Idaho Const. Art. II, § 1 (providing that no branch of government may exercise
power properly belonging to either of the others, except as expressly directed or
permitted by the constitution); State v. Finch, 79 Idaho 275, 281, 315 P.2d 529,
531 (1957) Uudicial power vested in the courts cannot be conferred upon any
agency of the executive department in the absence of constitutional authority).
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The Idaho Supreme Court has described such "rightly pertain[ed]"
powers as those inherently held by the judiciary, as identified in the common law,
and as described by the Idaho Constitution. See State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236,
240, 386 P.2d 247, 251 (1971 ); Idaho Const. Article V. Thus, the relevant issue
as to the constitutionality of I.C. § 20-621 in this case is whether a county
sheriff's ability to direct magistrate courts to release inmates infringes upon a
power

"rightly

pertain[ing]"

to

the judiciary,

and

whether some

Idaho

constitutional provision expressly permits the legislature to divest this power.
On appeal, Thiel notes that there are "several instances" in which the
Idaho appellate courts have held that the legislative or executive branch may
divest "discretion out of the hands of the sentencing judge," including mandatory
minimum sentences, and the Idaho Commission of Pardon and Parole's
commutations of sentences. (Respondent's brief, pp.4-5 (citations omitted)).
However, in both of these instances, the relevant powers were expressly
granted to the legislature by the Idaho Constitution. Article V, § 13 of the Idaho
Constitution specifically permits the legislature to "provide mandatory minimum
sentences for any crimes." Article IV, § 7 gave the legislature the authority to
create the board of pardons, and to grant that board the power to commute and
pardon

convicted defendants.

Article

IV,

§ 7 also

provides that "no

commutation" of sentences may be granted except as provided for in that
section.

See also Bates v. Murphy, 118 Idaho 239, 242, 796 P.2d 116, 119

(1990) (holding that several Idaho Commission of Pardons and Parole sentence
discharges were void because they constituted "commutations" and did not
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comply with the procedures set forth in Article IV, Sec. 7). Thiel has identified no
Idaho Constitutional provision that permits the legislature to grant county sheriffs
the authority to commute sentences and release inmates upon the sheriff's own
unreviewable determination of the satisfaction of certain requirements.
Instead, to the extent I.C. § 20-621 provides county sheriffs the authority
to direct magistrate courts to release inmates, the statute impermissibly divests
power "rightly pertain[ing]" to the judicial department; specifically, the powers to
sentence offenders,

to

suspend

sentences

(and

implicitly to

re-impose

suspended sentences after a probation violation), and to compel obedience to
lawful orders.

(See Appellant's brief, p.11 (citing Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho

227, 232, 392 P.2d 279 281 (1964) (recognizing inherent judicial power to control
and prevent abuse of court orders); McCoy, 94 Idaho at 239-240, 486 P.2d at
250-251 (recognizing inherent judicial power to exercise discretion in sentencing,
and to suspend sentences); State v. Easley, 156 Idaho 214, 302-303, 322 P.2d
296 (2014) (recognizing inherent judicial power to determine sentence).)
Next, Thiel contends that, even to the extent Idaho Constitution-created
district courts have the inherent authority described above, I.C. § 20-621

pertains, by its own language, only to magistrate courts. (Appellant's brief, pp.35.) Thiel asserts that because magistrate courts were created by the legislature,
and because the legislature is constitutionally empowered to determine the
jurisdiction of magistrate courts, "there is no separation of powers issue" with
regard to magistrate courts. (Id.)

5

Theil's argument fails because the Idaho Constitution prohibits the
legislature from divesting power from the "judicial department," not merely from
constitutionally-created courts.

Idaho Const. Art. II, § 1; Art. V, § 13.

The

magistrate courts are a division of district court, and thus part of the Idaho judicial
"department." See St. Benedict's Hosp. v. Twin Falls County, 107 Idaho 143,
146, 686 P.2d 88, 91 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing I.C. §§ 1-2208, 2210; I.R.C.P.
82(c)(1 ), 82(c)(2)) (disapproved of on other grounds by University of Utah Hosp.
on Behalf of Scarberry v. Board of County Com'rs, 116 Idaho 434, 438-439, 776
P.2d 443, 447-448 (Idaho 1989)); see also Idaho Const. Art. V, § 2 (expressly
identifying legislative-created courts as part of the "judicial power of the state").
The magistrate court division thus has the same inherent authority and same
protections against intrusion from other branches that the district court does,
subject only to express constitutional limitations, such as the legislative branch's
constitutionally-derived authority to define the magistrate court's jurisdiction.
Idaho Const. Art. V, § 2
The magistrate court division is part of the "judicial department" of Idaho.
The legislature may not infringe upon the powers that "rightly pertain" to the
judicial department, including the magistrate court.

Among these powers are

those to sentence, to suspend sentences, and to control and prevent abuse of
court orders.

The legislature may not divest these powers from the judicial

department absent express constitutional authority to do so. Idaho Code § 20621, as interpreted by Thiel, violates the Idaho Constitution because it divests the
magistrate courts' inherent sentencing authority by granting county sheriffs the
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power to direct magistrate courts to release inmates, and to essentially modify
valid judgments of conviction.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to vacate the district court's
appellate decision, reinstate the magistrate court's order denying Thiel's motion
to release from custody, and to remand for further proceedings.
DATED this 4th day of August 2014

MARK W. OLSON
\
Deputy Attorney General
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